In the case in Poyil Salim v Thazhe Kandoth Mariyam (2024:KER:4912
In addressing the admission and maintenance of a Second Appeal, the Court emphasized the necessity of formulating substantial questions of law, as mandated by Order XLII Rule 2 in conjunction with Section 100 of the CPC. However, in this case, the Appellants failed to raise any substantial question of law warranting the admission of the Second Appeal. The Court emphasized that the existence of a substantial question of law is a prerequisite for entertaining a second appeal.
Section 100 of the CPC reads as under:
“100. Second appeal.—(1) Save as otherwise expressly provided in the body of this Code or by any other law for the time being in force, an appeal shall lie to the High Court from every decree passed in appeal by any Court subordinate to the High Court, if the High Court is satisfied that the case involve a substantial question of law.
(2) An appeal may lie under this section from an appellate decree passed ex-parte.
(3) In an appeal under this section, the memorandum of appeal shall precisely state the substantial question of law involved in the appeal.
(4) Where the High Court is satisfied that a substantial question of law is involved in any case, it shall formulate that question.
(5) The appeal shall be heard on the question so formulated and the respondent shall, at the hearing of the appeal, be allowed to argue that the case does not involve such question:
Provided that nothing in this sub-section shall be deemed to take away or abridge the power of the Court to hear, for reasons to be recorded, the appeal on any other substantial question of law, not formulated by it, if it is satisfied that the case involves such question.”
Rules 1 to 3 of Order XLII of the CPC provide for procedure for deciding a second appeal
An appeal is judicial examination by a higher court of a decision of a subordinate court to rectify any possible error(s) in the order under appeal. The law provides the remedy of an appeal because of the recognition that those manning the judicial tiers too commit errors.
In Shankar Ramchandra Abhyankar v. Krishnaji Dattatreya Bapat1
, it was held thus:
“5.……In the well known work of Story on Constitution (of United States), Vol. 2, Article 1761, it is stated that the essential criterion of appellate jurisdiction is that it revises and corrects the proceedings in a cause already instituted and does not create that cause. The appellate jurisdiction may be exercised in a variety of forms and, indeed, in any form in which the Legislature may choose to prescribe. According to Article 1762 the most usual modes of exercising appellate jurisdiction, at least those which are most known in the United States, are by a
writ of error, or by an appeal, or by some process of removal of a suit from an inferior tribunal. An appeal is a process of civil law origin and removes a cause, entirely subjecting the fact as well as the law, to a review and a retrial.
Order XLII of the CPC provides for the procedure to be followed while deciding appeals from the appellate decrees. It states that the Rules of Order XLI shall apply, so far as may be, to the appeals from appellate decrees.
Words such as “so far as may be” or “insofar as” mean ‘as much’ or ‘to the extent’ or ‘to such extent’. By virtue of Order XLII Rule 1, the provisions of Order XLI are applicable to second appeal as well, though not in their entirety, but to certain extent.
If, however, the High Court is satisfied after hearing the appellant at the time of admission that the appeal does not involve any substantial question of law, then such appeal is liable to be dismissed in limine without any notice to the respondents after recording a finding in the dismissal order that the appeal does not involve any substantial question of law within the meaning of sub-section . It is needless to say that for passing such order in limine, the High Court is required to assign the reasons in support of its conclusion.”