A murder is not eligible to succeed to the property of person murdered.

He cannot be successor to wife estate if he has murdured  his wife 

 If the offence is proved beyond doubt and convicted for the heinous offence of killing his wife, such a person will not be entitled to be the successor to the same wife.

Under provisions of Hindu succession act murderer cannot inherit estate 

A person who commits murder or abets the commission of murder shall be disqualified from inheriting the property of the person murdered, or any other property in furtherance of the succession to which he or she committed or abetted the commission of the murder.

No he cannot be a shareholder in her property.

No. The law is very much clear. A person who commits murder or abets the commission of murder shall be disqualified from inheriting the property of the person murdered.

A Killer is barred to succeed his victim's property by law. 

The rationale behind this is that the criminal should not be allowed to enrich himself by his crime. 

Hindu Succession Act, 1956 - Section  25: states that 'Murderer disqualified'

A person who commits murder or abets the commission of murder shall be disqualified from inheriting the property of the person murdered, or any other property in furtherance of the succession to which he or she committed or abetted the commission of the murder.

In Sarvanabhavav. Sallemmal12the High Court of Madras had observed that it is common to almost all the system of law that the person found guilty of homicide cannot succeed to the property of the person murdered. Section 25 of the Act gives statutory recognition to the abovementioned proposition.

In Nirbhai Singh v. Financial Commissioner (Revenue), Punjab and others24 the legal issue raised was whether a convict under Section 304A of IPC claims non-application of Section 25 of the Act? The Court in its judgement incorporated the paramount of principle of public policy bases on the principle of justice, equity and good conscience. It stated that where the petitioner inflicted several blows on the left side of his chest using a knife he would be subjected to disqualification rule. The Court had made it clear that where the accused killed the deceased, it hardly makes any difference whether he has been sentenced under Section 302 of given the benefit of the grave and sudden provocation and convicted under 304A of IPC, a man who does wrong cannot benefit from it.

In M. Magarajanv. V.M. Nagammal 26, the mother-in-law had filed a suit against her son-inlaw who was convicted of the murder of her daughter. The deceased was employed as a typist in Excise department and so the mother-in-law filed the present suit claiming that she be declared the sole heir of her deceased daughter’s property and benefits such as gratuity, general provident fund, etc. from the Excise Department. It was pointed out by the Court that Section 25 does not specifically debar the murderer from receiving the services or death benefits of the victim. Still, the Court passed a decree in her favour following the principle of justice, equity and good conscience. It observed that the aforementioned principle can be applied in case where there is no specific law.

Similarly in Vellikannuv. R. Singaperumal and another35 where the only son, being a coparcener in a joint Hindu family governed by Mitakshara law, murdered his father, who died intestate the son was totally disqualifies from inheriting any interest in the coparcenary property it was held that:

even if a murderer is not disqualified under Hindu law from succeeding to the estate of the person whom he has murdered, is so disqualified upon the principles of justice, equity and good conscience.”

Hence, it can be deduced that the term murder under Section 25 of the Act has to be comprehensively interpreted keeping in mind the paramount principle of public policy that a person should not benefit from his own wrong or illegal act. Therefore, it does not follow the technical definition as given under Section 300 of IPC, 1860 rather is based upon the concept of justice, equity and good conscience.

As has been well elucidated in Laxmipat Choraria v. State of Maharashtra36:
“…..to keep the sword hanging over the head of an accomplice and to examine him as a witness is to encourage perjury.” And so technicalities shall in no case overshadow substantial justice.

Yes unless she has not made a will to bequeath the same to any other party

- As per Section 25 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, a person who commits murder or abets the commission of murder shall be disqualified from inheriting the property of the person murdered, or any other property in furtherance of the succession to which, he or she committed or abetted the commission of murder.

Dear client, 

Anyone who abets or is guilty of murder, then he will not be eligible to be the successor and claim and properties of her. 

Thank you

No, he is not the successor of the property of his wife.

• As per section 25. Murderer disqualified.—A person who commits murder or abets the commission of murder shall be disqualified from inheriting the property of the person murdered, or any other property in furtherance of the succession to which he or she committed or abetted the commission of the murder.
  

JUDGMENT

1. The plaintiff who is a minor filed the suit through her next friend, maternal grant-mother for a declaration that the money lying in the special savvings Bank Account No.14/1168 with the State Bank of Hyderabad, juhu Branch, Bombay exclusively belongs to her deceased mother as her self-acquired and self-earned separate properly and in view of the provisions of S. 25 of the Hindu succession Act, 1956 daughter alone is entiled to get the said amount.

2. It appears to be an admitted position that defenant No.1 sushilkumar was prosectued for an offence punsihable under section 302 of the penal code in sessions case no.196 of 1980 decided on 29th of oct., record the sessions court came to the conclusion that accused sushilkumar used a sharp-edged Revathi. While inflicting the injuries he chose vital part of the body and used considerable force. The sessions court further found that in view of the number of injuries and their location considered together with other factors clearly indicate that accused sushilkumar did the act with intention of causing the death of Revathi,After recording this finding the leraned judge ultimately came to the conculsion that he committed the said act of assault while he was deprived of the power of self-control by grave and sudden provocation given to him by deceassed Revathi. As a result of this finding he was convicted of the offence punihable under s. 304 part I of the I.P.C. and was sentenced to suffer rigorous imprisionment for seven years and to pay a fine of Rs.1000/- or in default to suffer further rigorous imprisonment for six months. In the suit filed on behalf of the minor it was contended that as the defendent No.1 was responsible for committing murder of deceased Revathi, he is not entitled to succeed to the property of decased in view of the provisions of S. 25 of the Hindu sucession Act. In this suit an injunction was also sought against defendant No.1 restraining him from withdfrawing the amount from the Bank. The trial Court framed necessary issues and ultimately came to the conclusion on the strength of the affidavit filed by the guardian and next friend of the plaintiff that money lying in the special saving bank account exculsively belonged to the deceased mother of the plaintiff. He also came to the conclusion that in view of the conviction of defendant No.1 under s. 304 , part I of the I.P.C. he is not disqualified under S. 25 of the hindu Succession Act. So far as the aomount of Rs. 6,800/- is concernd, which according to the plaintiff belonged to her being proceeds of the lottery prizes earned in the lottery tickets purchased in her name and credited in the account in the Bank, the learned Judge held that for that purpose the plantiff will have to pursue a separate remedy as such a declaration cannot be granted in the present suit as framed. In view of these fingings tje ;earned Judge decreed the claim of the plaintiff to the extent of Rs.5831-31 p. Only and also granted leave to the plaintiff to file a fresh suit in respect of the amount of Rs.6,800/- He also granted necessary reliefs including that of permanent injunction to the extent of Rs.5831 -31 p.

3. Being aggrived by this judgment and decree the plaintiff has filed the present appeal. Defendant No. 1 has also filed a cross objection challenging the finding recorded against him and has also explained the circumstances under which he remained absent in the trial court and has prayed that the exparte decree should be set aside and he should be given an opportunity to defend the suit on merits. According to him the could not remain present in court because he was detained in jail and the counsel appearing for him remained absent on the date of hearing.

4. Shri pathak, learned counsel appearing for the appellant contented before me that the interpretation put forward by the learned Judge upon the provisions of S. 25 of the Hindu succession Act is wholly illegal. According to shri pathak the pharaseology used in S. 25 of the Hindu Succession Act is 'a person who commits murder or abets commission of murder". The section does not contemplate that the person should be convicted or sentenced for the offence of murder. Shri pathak has also contended that the word "murder" is not defined in the Hindu succession Act. Therefore, the meaning assigned to the said word in the I.P.C. cannot be incorportated in S. 25 while construing the said provision. In the absence of the definition of the term "murder" it will have to be given the meaning as understood in common parlance; and if so understood it will include all sorts of culpable homicides. In support of his contention shri pathak has relied upon the decision of the Andhra pradesh High court in Nannepuneni seetharamaiah v. Nannepuneni Ramakrishnaiah, . A decision of this court in Girimallappa Channappa v. Kanchava, ILR. (1921) 45 Bom 768 : AIR 1921 Bom 270, which is confirmed by the privey council in kanchawa sonyllappa v. Girimallappa channappa, AIR 1924 PC 209 . He is also relying upon the decision of the madras High court in Sarvanabhava v. Sallemmal .

5. On the other hand it is contended by shri patel, learned counsel appearing for respondent no. 1 that as the word "Murder" is not defined in the Hindu succession Act and is only defined in the I.P.C. the said term will have to be given the meaning as assigned to it in he I.P.C. Therefore, unless a person is convicted of the offence of murder, under S. 302 of I.P.C. he is not disqualified under S. 25 of the Hindu Succession Act. According to shri patel, as in the present case respondent No.1 is convicted for for an offence punishable under S. 304, part I of the I.P.C. viz. Culpable homicide not amounting to murder, the learned judge of the trial court was right in coming to she conclusion that defendant No.1 was not disqualified to succeed to the property of the deceassed Revathi under S. 25 of the Hindu succession Act.

6. For properly appreciating the controversy raised before me , it is necessary to make a detailed reference to the provisions of Ss. 25 and 27 of the Hindu seccession Act. Which read as under :-

"25. A person who commits murder or abets the commission of murder shall be disqualifed from inheriting the property of the person murdered or any other property in furtherance of the succession to which he or she committed or abetted the commission of the murder.

27. If any person is disqualified from in heriting any property under this Act, it shall devolve as if such person had died before the intestate."

7. It is an admitted position that the word "murder" is not defined in the Hindu succession Act, It appears that S. 25 was introduced in the Hindu succession Act practically to give stautory sanction to the view expressed by the privy council in kanchawa v. Girimallappa, AIR 1924 PC. 209 while dealing with such a contention the privy Council; observed that there is much to be said in support of the principles of jurisprudence which can be traced in Hindu Law, which would warrant in inference that a man cannot take advantage of his own wrong. The privy council further observed that this principle is the principle of equity, justice and good conscience, which disqualifies and exludes the murderer from inheriting any interest in the property of the person murdered. The privy council also held that the murderer in such case should be treated as non-existent and not as one who forms the stock for fresh line of descent. Thus, it appears that S.s 25 and 27 were enacted by the legislature to give statutory approval to the principles of equity, justice and good conscience which disqualifis murder from inheriting the property of the person murdered . Therefore, the woeds and pharses used in S. 25 will have to be construed in the light of these principles viz. The principles of equity, justice and good conscience. This is also the well established principle of public policy.

8. As observed by the privy council in Lawrence Arthus Adamson v. Melbourne and Metropolitan Board of Works, AIR 1929 PC 181 :

" It is always unsatisfactory and generally unsafe to seek the meaning of words used in an Act in the definition clauses of another statute dealing with matters more or less cognate even when enacted by the same legislature.' The supreme court has also expressed the similar view in the Board of Muslim Wakfs, Rajasthan v. Radha Krishan, and has observed that (at p. 295):

"It is not a sound principle of construction to interpret expressions used in one Act with reference to their use in another Act and decisions rendered with reference to construction of one Act cannot apply with reference to the provisions of another Act, unless the two Acts are in pari materia."

It is an admitted position that two enactments are neither cognate nor pari materia and cover different fields . Therefore, in my opinion words and pharases used in S. 25 of the Hidu succession Act will have to be construed and interpreted harmoniously keeping in view the object of the legislation, and not in technical sense as defined in I.P.C.

9. In this context a reference could also be made to the following observation in Halsburry's Laws of England, Thrid Edition, vol.39 para. 1315, p.869:-

"Murder or manslaughter. It is contrary to public policy that a man should be allowed to claim a benefit resulting from his own crime. Accordingly a donee who is proved to be guilty of the murder or manslaughter of the testator cannot take any benefit under his will."

It is this principle of public policy that a person cannot be allowed to claim benefit resulting from his own crime which is approved by the privy council in Kanchava's case AIR 1924 PC 209. When the Hindu succession Act, 1956 was enacted, the legislature had before it the decision of theprivy council in Kanchawa's case and it appears that it is this well established principle of public policy which legislature thorught fit to incorporate in S.25 of the Act , so that the person will not be tempted to commit murder to inherit the property of the person murdered.

10. It is well settled that the woed not defined in the Act but a word of every day use must be construed in popular sense as understood in common parlance . and not in a technical sense. In popular sense the word "murder " means unlawful homicide or unlawful killing of human being. In popular parlance the word "murder" is not used or understood in the technical sense as defined in S. 300 of the I.P.C. wo;; result in defeating the very object of the legislation. It will also run counter to the well established principles of equity, justice and good conscience, or the paramount principle of public policy enshrined in S. 25 of Hindu succession Act. I am fortified in this view by t he decision of the Madras High Court in Sarvanabhava v. Sallemmal the Madras High court has observed as under :

" Almost all systems of law have recognised that a person guilty of homicide cannot succeed to the property of his victim. Section 25 of the Hindu succession Act gives statutory recognition to the above proposition."

11. In the present case defendant No.1 is convicted of the offence punishable under S. 304 part of I.P.C. viz. For the offence of culpable homicide. From the findings recorded by the learned sessions Judge it is clear that as many as eleven incised injuries were inflicted by defendant No.1 with a sharp edged knife on the person of deceased Revathi. He chose vital part of the body for inflicting these injuries and had used considerable force. He assaulted Revathi with the intention of causing her death. Therefore it can sefely be held that he has committed murder iof Revathi within the meaning of the said expression as used in S. 25 of the Hindy succession Act, 1956 and therefore is disqualified from inheriting the property of deceased Revathi, the person murdered. Similar view is taken by Andhra Pradesh High court in Nannepuneni Seetaramaiah v. Nannepueni Ramakrishnaniah, , wherein it is observed by the Andhra pradesh High court that to apply the disqualification underS.25 of hindu succession Act it is not necessary that the person who committed murder or abetted commission of murder must also have been convicted of the offence of murder or of abatment of murder under S. 302 of the I.P.C.

The said section application of the section should not be approached from the point of view of punishment for murder.

12. In my opinion this is the correct approach for interpreting the provisions of section 25 of the Act, which incorporates a paramount principle of public policy based on principle of public policy based on principles of justice, equity and goodf conscience, so that the person will not be able to take the advantage of his own crime. In this context it is pertinent to note that the words used are "commits murder or abets commission of murder" and not "is convicted of an offence of murder and not "is convicted of an offence of murder or abetment of offence of murder." Therefore, it is clear that the legislaature has used the term "murder" in S. 25 of the Hindu Succession Act not in a technical sense as defined in S. 300 of the I.P.C. ., but in a wider and popular sense, which must include in its import even culpable homicide or unlawful manslaughter. It is neither possible not desirable to lay down general rule in this behalf, because to some extent it must depend on the facts and circumstances of each case.

13. However,at this this stage I am informed shri Pathak, learned counsel for the plaintiff that an appeal is filled against the said order of conviction by the defendant No.1 and the same is pending. He has further stated that the complainant has also filed a revision petition against the order of acquittal passed by the learned sessions Judge acquitting him of the offence under section 302 of the I.P.C. and the said revision petition is also pending. Therefore, I am not called upon at this stage to decide the question as to what will be the scope of inquiry before the civil court in case of acquittal. I have decided the question of disqualification under S. 25 of the Hindu succession Act on the basis of the position as it stands today. Parties are at liberty to raise all permissible contentions in case of subsequent development or change in circumstances.

14. So far tas the merits of the controversy are concerned, it does appear that because of the pendency of the sessions case and subsequent conviction, defendant No.1 remained absent in the trial Court. It is no the doubt true that he had engaged a counsel at the initial stage but subseqently the counsel also remained absent and the matter proceeded exparte against him. Shri Patel, learned counsel appearing for defendant No.1 has contended that money lying in deposit in Bank belonged to defendant No.1 alone and not to deceased Revathi. He further contended that to prover this fact defendatnt No.1 should be given an opportunity to file a written statement and lead evidence in support of his case. In all fairness shri pathak has conceded before me that in view of the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case he has no objection if defendant No.1 is given an opportunity to contest the claim of the plaintiff on merits. However, he has further submitted that in that case the plaintiff should also be given an opportunity to amend the plaint the claim a relief of declaration even qua the amount of Rs.6,800/- which according to the plaintiff exclusively belongs to her as it represents the proceeds of lottery prize earned by the plaintiff herself on the tickets purchased in her name though said amount was credited in the joint account of Revathi and defendant No.1 shri patel, learned counsel defendant No.1 has no objection for giving such an opportunity to the plaintiff. In this view of the matter by consent of the parties the judgment and decree passed by the learned Judg of the City Civiul court Bombay dated [deleted] is set aside and the matter is remitted back to the city Civil Court for deciding it on merits on accordance with law after giving a reasonable opportunity to both parties to put forward their respective cases. It is needless to say that after remand the plaintiff will be entilled to amend her plaint and claim a relief of declaration qua Rs.6,800/- and also carry on other consequential amendments, if neccessary. The defendant will also be at liberty to file this written statement and thereafter the trial court will decide the suit on merits in accordance with law. Since the plaintiff is a minor and her mother is dead and the father is also in jail . this is a fit case which requires priority and, therefore the trial court is directed to hear and decide the suit as expeditiously as possible preferably before the 31st of Dec., 1981.

15. During the pendency of the suit the ad interim injunction granted by the trial Court restraining the defendant No.1 from withdrawing the amount from the Bank shall continue. The parties are directed to appear before the trial court on 29th of June, 1981. Thus the appeal is partly allowed. Since by consent of the parties the matter is being remitted back, no orders on cross-objection are necessaary. In the circumstances of the caase there will be order as to costs in this appeal as well as in cross-objection.

16. Order accordingly.

2005 ALL SCR 254

SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Appeal (Civil) 4838 of 1999

6th May, 2005

ASHOK BHAN, J.

A.K. MATHUR, J.

2

Vellikannu

R. Singaperumal & Anr.

Hindu Succession Act (1956)

Penal Code (1860)

Section 6 Hindu Succession Act (1956)

Section 8 Hindu Succession Act (1956)

Section 25 Hindu Succession Act (1956)

Section 27 Hindu Succession Act (1956)

Schedule 1 Class I Hindu Succession Act (1956)

Section 302 Penal Code (1860)

Conviction, Co-owners, Decree, Admission, Equity, Adoption, Government, Interest, Disqualification, Lease, Murder, Ownership, Partition, Public Policy, Reference, Sentence, State, Succession, Suit, Victim

Para 25: State Bank of India Vs. Ghamandi Ram reported in AIR 1969 SC 1333

Para 26: State of Maharashtra Vs. Narayan Rao Sham Rao Deshmukh & Ors. reported in (1985) 2 SCC 321

Para 27: Kenchava Kom Sanyellappa Hosmani & Anr. Vs. Girimallappa Channappa Somasagar reported in AIR 1924 PC 209

Para 27: Vedanayaga Mudaliar Vs. Vedammal

Para 28: Gangu Vs. Chandrabhagabai reported in (1908) 32 Bom. 275

Para 30: K.Stanumurthiayya & Ors. Vs. K.Ramappa & Ors. AIR (29) 1942 Madras 277

Para 30: Nakchhed Singh & Ors. Vs. Bijai Bahadur Singh & Anr. AIR 1953 All. 759

Para 30: Mata Badal Singh & Ors. Vs. Bijay Bahadur Singh & Ors. AIR 1956 All. 707

Para 30: Minoti Vs. Sushil Mohansingh Malik & Anr. AIR 1982 Bomb. 68

A.K. MATHUR, J.:- This appeal is directed against the judgment of the learned Single Judge of Judicature at Madras whereby the learned Single Judge by his order dated 6th March, 1997 has allowed the Second Appeal No. 773 of 1983 filed by the respondent-1st Defendant herein.

2. Brief facts which are necessary for disposal of this appeal are;

That an Original Suit NO. 87/1978 was filed in the Court of the District Munsif, Melur by the plaintiff-appellant (herein).

3. The schedule properties are the self-acquired properties of late Ramasami Konar and the first defendant was the only son of Ramasami Konar and the plaintiff is the wife of the first defendant. Wife of Ramasami Konar was already divorced and married with some other person and was residing separately. It is alleged that the first defendant in the suit married the plaintiffappellant and both were residing as husband and wife. On 10th October, 1972 the first defendant murdered his father, Ramasami Konar and was convicted under Section 302 IPC for life imprisonment. The conviction of the first defendant was confirmed by the High Court but the High Court recommended the Government to reduce the sentence to the period already undergone. The first defendant was released in July, 1975. Since the first defendant murdered his father, he was not entitled to succeed to the estate of his deceased father and as such the claim of the plaintiff was that she alone was entitled to all the properties left by the deceased Ramasami Konar. According to the plaintiff, the first defendant must be deemed to have predeceased as provided under Section 25 read with Section 27 of the Hindu Succession Act. She claimed to be the widow of the first defendant and claimed to be the owner of all the properties left by Ramasami Konar as coparcener. After the release of the first defendant from the prison, first defendant lived with the plaintiff for some time but after some time she was driven out of the house. Second defendant is already impleaded in the suit as tenant claiming under first defendant. Plaintiff, therefore, prayed that she may be granted the relief of declaration as she is entitled to inherit the entire estate of the deceased Ramasami Konar. As against this it was contended by the first defendant that the suit was not maintainable as the plaintiff is not the legal heir of Ramasami Konar. It was alleged that all the properties acquired by the Ramasami, were joint family properties and the first defendant has acquired the same by survivorship. The Trial Court by Order dated 31st March, 1980 held that all the properties are joint family properties of the deceased Ramasami Konar and first defendant. The second defendant is a cultivating tenant. The first defendant having murdered his father is not entitled to claim any right under Section 6 read with Sections 25 & 27 of the Act but as per proviso to Section 6 of the Hindu Succession Act plaintiff is entitled to a decree for half share and accordingly it was granted to the plaintiff. This matter was taken up in appeal by defendant No. 1. The Lower Appellate Court also confirmed the finding of the Trial Court but modified the decree that it may be treated as preliminary decree. The Lower Court also held that first defendant must be treated as nonexistent. The plaintiff became a Class I heir under Schedule 1 of the Hindu Succession Act and she was entitled to a share in the property. The appeal was dismissed.

4. Aggrieved against this, the first defendant preferred a second appeal before the High Court.

5. The High Court at the time of admission of the Second Appeal, framed following substantial questions of law.

"1. Whether Ex.A.2 judgment in the Criminal case is conclusive on the question of exclusion from inheritance in the present proceedings?

and 2. Whether the exclusion from inheritance would cover enlargement of interest by survivorship, in the light of Section 6 of Hindu Succession Act ?"

6. So far as the question No. 1 is concerned, the High Court held that the judgment of the Criminal Court can be taken into consideration. But the main question which was addressed by the High Court was whether the plaintiff can inherit the properties from the estate of her deceased father-in-law, Ramasami Konar and what is the effect of Section 25, Section 27 read with Section 6 and Section 8 of the Hindu Succession Act. It was not disputed that the properties of the Ramasami Konar were joint family properties in which the defendant No. 1 was also one of the member and the parties are governed by the Mitakshara School of Hindu Law.

7. The learned Single Judge of the High Court after hearing the parties and considering the relevant law on the subject in detail, came to the conclusion that the view taken by both the Courts below cannot be sustained. It was held by the learned Single Judge that plaintiff cannot claim as a widow of the son of Ramasamy Konar. It was observed that plaintiff cannot claim one half share in the property being coparcenary property under Proviso to Section 6 of the Hindu Succession Act . It was also observed that she is entitled to half share so long as the deceased father and son had not partitioned the property. The first defendant/ respondent No 1 herein cannot be said to have inherited any share from the victim (Ramasamy Konar) and the Plaintiff can claim as a widow only if there is a succession to the estate of the victim. If there is no succession, the deeming provision that the first defendant shall be deemed to have died before the victim (his father) also will not apply and she cannot claim as a widow of his pre-deceased son. It was also held that Section 6 of the Hindu Succession Act will also not apply. The principle of justice, equity and public policy will apply and the plaintiff cannot be treated as a fresh stock of descent and defendant No.1 shall be treated as a non-existent as if he never existed. Therefore, the plaintiff also cannot claim as his widow. It was also observed that since plaintiff claims as a widow of the defendant No. 1 and he is disqualified, same disqualification equally applies to her for she cannot claim through murderer husband.

8. Learned single Judge allowed the appeal of the defendant No. 1/respondent No. 1 (herein) and judgment and decree of the Courts below were set aside. The suit was dismissed. Hence the present appeal.

9. Learned counsel for the appellant tried to persuade us that appellant being the sole female survivor of the Joint Hindu Property as her husband stands disqualified, she under proviso to Section 6 of the Act, is entitled to the whole of the estate as a sole survive member of the coparcenary property read with Section 8 of the Act as a Class I heir. As against this, learned counsel for the respondent-defendant has submitted that this disqualification which was attached to the son equally applies in the case of the wife as she is claiming the estate because of her marriage with the respondent and if he is disqualified, then she is also equally disqualified to claim any property being a coparcener from the estate of her deceased father in law.

10. In order to appreciate the rival contention, it would be relevant to reproduce provisions of the Hindu Succession Act.

11. Sections 6, 8, 25 and 27 of the Act which read as under:

"Section 6. Devolution of interest in coparcenary property- When a male Hindu dies after the commencement of this Act, having at the time of his death an interest in a Mitakshara coparcenary property, his interest in the property shall devolve by survivorship upon the surviving members of the coparcenary and not in accordance with this Act:

Provided that, if the deceased had left him surviving a female relative specified in Class I of the Schedule or a male relative specified in that class who claims through such female relative, the interest of the deceased in the Mitakshara coparcenary property shall devolve by testamentary or intestate succession, as the case may be, under this Act and not by survivorship.

Explanation 1.- For the purposes of this section, the interest of a Hindu Mitakshara coparcener shall be deemed to be the share in the property that would have been allotted to him if a partition of the property had taken place immediately before his death, irrespective of whether he was entitled to claim partition or not..

Explanation 2.- Nothing contained in ;the proviso to this section shall be construed as enabling a person who has separated himself from the coparcenary before the death of the deceased of any of his heirs to claim on intestacy a share in the interest referred to therein."

12. Section 8.- General rules of succession in the case of males.- The property of a male Hindu dying intestate shall devolve according to the provisions of this Chapter :-

(a) firstly, upon the heirs, being the relatives specified in class I of the Schedule;

(b) secondly, if there is no heir of class I, then upon the heirs, being the relatives specified in class II of the Schedule;

(c) thirdly, if there is no heir of any of the two classes, then upon the agnates of the deceased; and

(d) lastly, if there is no agnate, then upon the cognates of the deceased.

13. Section 25.- Murderer disqualified. \026 A person who commits murder or abets the commission of murder shall be disqualified from inheriting the property of the person murdered, or any other property in furtherance of the succession to which he or she committed or abetted the commission of the murder.

14. Section 27.- Succession when heir disqualified - If any person is disqualified from inheriting any property under this Act, it shall devolve as if such person had died before the intestate."

15. As per Section 6 of the Hindu Succession Act, if a male Hindu dies after commencement of this Act, an interest in a Mitakshara coparcenary property shall devolve by survivorship upon the surviving members of the coparcenary and not in accordance with the Act. So far as the present case is concerned, the concurrent finding of the fact is that the deceased Ramasamy Konar was governed by Mitakshara Law and the property was the coparcenary property. But he died iintestate. Therefore, as per Section 6, the property shall devolve by survivorship upon the surviving members of the coparcenary and not by Section 6 of the Act and at the same time there is proviso to Section which qualifies the main Section that if deceased left a surviving female relative specified in class I of the Schedule or a male relative specified in that class who claims through such female, the interest of deceased in Mitakshara coparcenary property shall devolve by testamentary or intestate succession, as the case may be and not by survivorship.

16. So far as the property in question is concerned, there is a finding of the Courts below that the property is a coparcenary property and if that being so, if the defendant No. 1 had not murdered his father then perhaps a thing would have taken a different shape. But what is the effect on the succession of the property of the deceased father when son has murdered him. If he had not murdered his father he would have along with his wife would have succeed in the matter. So far as the rights of coparceners in the Mitakshara Law are concerned, son acquires by birth or adoption a vested interest in all coparcenery property whether ancestral or not and whether acquired before or after his birth or adoption, as the case may be, as a member of a joint family. This is the view which has been accepted by all the Authors of the Hindu Law. The famous principles of Mulla , 15th Edition (1982) at pages 284 and 285, the learned Author has stated thus:

"The essence of a coparcenary under the Mitakshara Law is unity of ownership. The ownership of the coparcenary property is in the whole body of coparceners. According to the true notion of an undivided family governed by the Mitakshara Law, no individual members of that family, whilst it remains un-divided, can predicate, of the joint and undivided property, that he that particular member, has a definite share, one third or one-fourth. His interest is a fluctuating interest, capable or being enlarged by deaths in the family, and liable to be diminished by births in the family. It is only on a partition that he becomes entitled to a definite share. The most appropriate term to describe the interest of coparcener in coparcenary property is "undivided coparcenary interest". The nature and extent of that interest is defined in Section 235. The rights of each coparcener until a partition takes place consist in a common possession and common enjoyment of the coparcenary property. As observed by the privy council of Katama Natchiar versus The Rajah of Shivagunga, " there is community of interest and unity of possession between all the members of the family, and upon the death of any one of them the others may well take by survivorship that in which they had during the deceased’s lifetime a common interest and a common possession."

17. Likewise, S.V. Gupta, author of Hindu Law, Vol. 1, Third Edition (1981) at page 162, the learned author deals with the rights of a coparcener. He says thus:-

"Until partition, coparcener is entitled to:-

(1) join possession and enjoyment of joint family Property

(2) the right to take the joint family property by survivorship, and

(3) the right to demand partition of the joint family property"

18. At page 164, the learned author deals with the right of survivorship. He says;

"while the family remains joint, its property continues to devolve upon the coparcener for the time being by survivorship and not by succession. Consequently, on the death of a coparcener the surviving coparceners take his undivided interest in the joint family property by survivorship. There is community of interest and unity of possession between all the members of the family, and upon the death of any of them, the others may well take by survivorship that in which they had during the deceased’s life time a common interest and a common possession."

19. The learned Author further says :-

A coparcener who is disqualified by reason of a disability (such as insanity) from taking a share on partition may nevertheless take the whole property by survivorship."

20. At page 165, the learned Author has further said thus:

By survivorship a coparcener does not obtain the share of a deceased coparcener as his representative; strictly speaking it does not pass to him the effect if merely to enlarge his share in what he already owns in the aggregate. Surviving coparceners are not therefore, the legal representatives of a deceased coparcener".

21. In N.R. Raghavachariar’s Hindu Law \026 Principles and precedents " 8th Edition (1987) at page 230 under the heading ’Rights of Coparceners’ it is said thus:-

"The following are the rights of a coparcener :- (1) Right by birth (2) Right by survivorship, (3) Right to partition, (4) Right to joint possession and enjoyment, (5) Right to restrain unauthorized acts (6) Right of alienation, (7) Right to accounts and (8) Right to make self-acquisition".

22. While dealing with "Right by birth’ learned Author says thus:-

"Every coparcener gets an interest by birth in the coparcenary property. This right by birth relates back to the date of conception. This, however, must not be held to negative the position that coparcenary property may itself come into existence after the birth of the coparcener concerned \005"

23. While dealing with Right of survivorship, it is said thus:-

"The system of a joint family with its incident of succession by survivorship is a peculiarity of the Hindu Law. In such a family no member has any definite share and his death of somehow ceasing to be a member of the family causes no change in the joint status of the family. Where a coparcener dies without male issue his interest in the joint family property passes to the other coparceners by survivorship and not be succession to his own heir. Even where a coparcener becomes afflicted with Lunacy subsequent to his birth, he does not lose his status as a coparcener which he has acquired by his birth, and although his lunacy may under the Hindu Law disqualify him from demanding a share in a partition in his family. Yet where all the other coparceners die and he becomes the sole surviving member of the coparcenary, he takes the whole joint family property by survivorship, and becomes a fresh stock of descent to the exclusion of the daughter of the last pre-deceased coparcener, a case of leprosy of the last surviving coparcener. The beneficial interest of each coparcener is liable to fluctuation, increasing by the death of another coparcener and decreasing by the birth of a new coparcener\005"

24. Therefore, it is now settled that a member of coparceners acquires a right in the property by birth. His share may fluctuate from time to time but his right by way of survivorship in copracenary property in Mitakshara Law is a settled proposition.

25. In this connection, a reference may be made in the case of State Bank of India Vs. Ghamandi Ram reported in AIR 1969 SC 1333, it was held thus:-

"According to the Mitakshara School of Hindu Law all the property of a Hindu Joint Family is held in collective ownership by all the coparceners in the quasi-corporate copacity. The textual authority of the Mitakshara Lays down in express terms that the joint famil;y property is held in trust from the joint family members then living and thereafter to be both ( See Mitakshara, Chaper I, 1-27) The incidents of coparcernership under the Mitakshara Law are: first the lineal male descendants of a person upto the third generation, acquire on birth ownership in the ancestral properties of such person; Secondly that such descendants can at any time work out their rights by asking for partition; thirdly, that till partition each member has got ownership extending over the entire property co- jointly with the rest; forthly, that as a result of such co-ownership the possession and enjoyment of the properties is common fifthly that no alienation of the property is possible unless it before necessity, without the concurrence of the coparceners, and sixthly; that the interest of a deceased member lapses on his death to the survivors. A coparcenary under the Mitakshara School is a creature of law and cannot arise by act of parties except in so far that on adoption the adopted son becomes a co-parcener with his adoptive father as regards the ancestral properties of the letter."

26. The concept of coparcener as given in the Mitakshara School of Hindu Law as already mentioned above, is that of a joint family property wherein all the members of the coparceners share equally. In this connection a reference may be made to a decision of this Court in the case of State of Maharashtra vs. Narayan Rao Sham Rao Deshmukh & Ors. reported in (1985) 2 SCC 321 in which Their Lordships have held as follows:

" A Hindu coparcenary is however, a narrower body than the joint family. Only males who acquire by birth an interest in the joint or coparcenary property can be members of the coparcenary or coparceners. A male member of a joint family and his sons, grandsons and great grandsons constitute a coparcenary. A coparcener acquires right in the coparcenary property by birth but his right can be definitely ascertained only when a partition takes place. When the family is joint, the extent of the share of a coparcener cannot be definitely predicated since it is always capable of fluctuating."

27. Therefore, in view of various decisions of this Court it appears that Defendant No.1 and the plaintiff who was married to Defendant No.1 were members of joint Hindu family. If the defendant- appellant had not incurred the disqualification, then they would have inherited the property as per Mitakshara School of Hindu Law. But the question is that when the sole male survivor had incurred the disqualification can he still claim the property by virtue of Mitakshara School of Hindu Law ? If he cannot get the property by way of survivorship, then the question is whether his wife who succeeds through the husband can succeed to the property? Our answer to this question is in negative. In fact, prior to the amendment of the Hindu Succession Act, Sections like 25 & 27 were not there but the murderer of his own father was disqualified on the principle of justice, equity and good conscience and as a measure of public policy. This position of law was enunciated by the Privy Council way back in 1924 in the case of Kenchava Kom Sanyellappa Hosmani & Anr. vs. Girimallappa Channappa Somasagar reported in AIR 1924 PC 209 wherein Their Lordships have held as follows:

" In their Lordships’ view it was rightly held by the two Courts below that the murderer was disqualified ; and with regard to the question whether he is disqualified wholly or only as to the beneficial interest which the Subordinate Judge discussed, founding upon the distinction between the beneficial and legal estate which was made by the Subordinate Judge and by the High Court of Madras in the case of Vedanayaga Mudaliar v. Vedammal , their Lordships reject, as did the High Court here, any such distinction. The theory of legal and equitable estates is no part of Hindu law, and should not be introduced into discussion.

The second question to be decided is whether the title can be claimed through the murderer. If this were so, the defendants as the murderer’s sisters, would take precedence of the plaintiff, his cousin. In this matter also, their Lordships are of opinion that the Courts below were right. The murderer should be treated as nonexistent and not as one who forms the stock for a fresh line of descent. It may be pointed out that this view was also taken in the Madras case just cited."

28. Their Lordships also explained the decision in the case of Gangu vs. Chandrabhagabai reported in (1908) 32 Bom. 275 and held as follows :

" It was contended that a different ruling was to be extracted from the decision of the Bombay High Court in Gangu v. Chandrabnagabai. This is not so. In that case, the wife of a murderer was held entitled to succeed to the estate of the murdered man but that was not because the wife deduced title through her husband, but because of the principle of Hindu family law that a wife becomes a member of her husband’s gotra, an actual relation of her husband’s relations in her own right, as it is called in Hindu law a gotraja-sapinda. The decision therefore has no bearing on the present case. "

29. Therefore, the principle which has been enunciated by their Lordships is in no uncertain terms totally disinherit the son who has murdered his father. Their Lordships have observed as follows:

" A murderer must for the purpose of the inheritance, be treated as if he were dead when the inheritance opened and as not being a fresh stock of descent; the exclusion extends to the legal as well as beneficial estate, so that neither he can himself succeed nor can the succession be claimed through him."

30. This Privy Council decision made reference to the decisions of the High Courts of Madras and Bombay and their Lordships have approved the ratio contained in those decisions that a murderer should be totally disinherited because of the felony committed by him. This decision of the Privy Council was subsequently followed in the following cases :

i. AIR (29) 1942 Madras 277 (K.Stanumurthiayya & Ors. v. K.Ramappa & Ors.)

ii. AIR 1953 All. 759 ( Nakchhed Singh & Ors. vs. Bijai Bahadur Singh & Anr.)

iii. AIR 1956 All. 707 (Mata Badal Singh & Ors. vs. Bijay Bahadur Singh & Ors.)

iv. AIR 1982 Bomb. 68 ( Minoti vs. Sushil Mohansingh Malik & Anr.).

31. This position of law was incorporated by way of Section 25 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 as quoted above, which clearly enunciates that a person who commits murder or abates the commission of murder shall be disqualified from inheriting the property of the person murdered, or any other property in furtherance of the succession to which he or she committed or abetted the commission of the murder. In fact, the objects and reasons also makes a reference to the Privy Council judgment (supra). The objects and reasons for enacting Section 25 read as under :

" A murderer, even if not disqualified under Hindu Law from succeeding to the estate of the person whom he has murdered, is so disqualified upon principles of justice, equity and good conscience. The murdered is not to be regarded as the stock of a fresh line of descent but should be regarded as nonexistent when the succession opens."

32. Therefore, once it is held that a person who has murdered his father or a person from whom he wants to inherit, stands totally disqualified. Section 27 of the Hindu Succession Act makes it further clear that if any person is disqualified from inheriting any property under this Act, it shall be deemed as if such person had died before the intestate. That shows that a person who has murdered a person through whom he wants to inherit the property stands disqualified on that account. That means he will be deemed to have predeceased him. The effect of Section 25 read with Section 27 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 is that a murderer is totally disqualified to succeed to the estate of deceased. The framers of the Act in the objects and reasons have made a reference to the decision of the Privy Council that the murderer is not to be regarded as the stock of a fresh line of descent but should be regarded as non-existent. That means that a person who is guilty of committing the murder cannot be treated to have any relationship whatsoever with deceased’s estate.

33. Now, adverting to the facts of the present case, the effect of Sections 25 and 27 is that the respondent No.1 cannot inherit any property of his father as he has murdered him on the principle of justice, equity and good conscience and the fresh stock of his line of descent ceased to exist in that case. Once the son is totally disinherited then his whole stock stands disinherited i.e. wife or son. The defendant-respondent No.1 son himself is totally disqualified by virtue of Sections 25 and 27 of the Hindu Succession Act and as such the wife can have no better claim in the property of the deceased, Ramasamy Konar.

34. Therefore, as a result of our above discussion, we are of opinion that the view taken by the learned Single Judge of the High Court of Madras is correct that the plaintiff is not entitled to inherit the estate of the deceased, Ramasamy Konar and the learned Single Judge has rightly set aside the orders of the two courts below. Since we cannot decide this appeal without deciding the right of the respondent No.1 as the right of the appellant flows therefrom as his wife i.e. the plaintiff. Therefore, it was necessary for us to first decide whether the respondent No.1 could succeed or inherit the estate of his deceased father. When son cannot succeed then the wife who succeeds to the property through the husband cannot also lay a claim to the property of her father-in -law. The appeal is thus dismissed. No order as to costs.

Feel Free to Call

Swami Shradanand vs Gauhar Taj Namazie and others. Regular First Appeal 148/2003 decided on 17 March 2017.

Judgment Link: http://judgmenthck.kar.nic.in/judgmentsdsp/bitstream/123456789/159003/1/RFA[deleted].pdf?fbclid=IwAR3knwf8n83KNvLscdUhmuOdw10E1NsSSKeYhmGrk1ZRtxSznCy7tY4AU6M

Relevant paragraphs: 11.Having regard to the aforesaid rival contentions, the prime question for consideration in the application is, “Whether the appellant has incurred disqualification to represent the estate of deceased Shakereh Khaleeli on account of he murdering her and thereby disentitled to prosecute the appeal?”

13. There is no dispute that, from the Session’s Court till the Supreme  Court,  all  the Courts have held that the appellant, in a calculated manner got access to Shakereh Khaleeli to grab her properties, gained her trust and married her…..administered Shakereh Khaleeli the high doze sedatives laced tea, when she fell fast asleep, stuffed her into that wooden box and buried that box in the pit got dug by him and leveled the land, thus killed her when she was just forty.

Cases relied on: Girimallappa Channappa Somsagar vs Kenchava Sane Yellappa Hosmani (1921 Indian Cases Vol.LXIL, 294), Kenchavva Kom Sanyellapap Hosmani and another vs Girimallappa Channappa Somsagar (AIR 1924 Privy Council 209), Saroja Chandrasekar vs The Union of India Writ Petition 19942/2002 decided on 15 July 2015, Vellikannu vs. R.Singaperumal and another reported in  2005 (6) SCC 622, Vedanayaga  Mudaliar v. Vedammal (ILR (1904) 27 Mad 591), Gangu vs. Chandrabhagabai (1908)  32 Bom. 275, K.Stanumurthiayya & Ors. v. K.Ramappa & Ors., AIR (29), 1942 Madras 277, Nakchhed Singh & Ors. vs. Bijai Bahadur Singh & Anr., AIR 1953 All. 759, Mata     Badal     Singh     &     Ors.     vs.     Bijay Bahadur Singh & Ors., AIR 1956 All. 707, Minoti vs. Sushil Mohansingh Malik  & Anr., AIR 1982 Bom. 68.

24. In this case also, merely because there is no provision in the Indian Succession Act to disqualify the murderer to the estate of his own victim, it does not bar the Courts from disqualifying him from inheritance.

27. Having regard to the aforesaid facts and circumstances and judgments, even in  the  absence of specific provision in Indian Succession Act, for disqualification of a murderer to succeed to the  estate of his own victim, this Court draws authority from the Judgment of the Privy Council in Kenchavva Kom Sanyellapap Hosmani and another vs Girimallappa Channappa Somsagar (AIR 1924 Privy Council 209)…..appellant is not entitled to succeed to the estate       of        Shakereh      Khaleeli, whom he murdered.

31. At the cost of repetition, it is to be noted that when Bombay High Court  rendered  judgment in Girimallappa  Channappa  Somsagar’s  case referred to supra and Privy Council upheld  that  there was no law, much less the Hindu Succession Act disqualifying the murderer to succeed to his victim’s estate.

32. The case on hand is probably the first in the legal history, where a person having an eye on  the property of a wealthy woman gains access to her hatching the plan to grab her property and marries her under the Special Marriage Act and murders her in a very gruesome manner to grab her properties. Hopefully such cases may drive the concerned to amend the Indian Succession Act incorporating a Section pari metria to Sections 25 and 27 of the Hindu Succession Act.